Search and Seizure, Third-Part Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the Fourth Amendment by Fisher, Gregory S.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 1 
1-1-1991 
Search and Seizure, Third-Part Consent: Rethinking Police 
Conduct and the Fourth Amendment 
Gregory S. Fisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gregory S. Fisher, Comment, Search and Seizure, Third-Part Consent: Rethinking Police Conduct and the 
Fourth Amendment, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 189 (1991). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol66/iss1/5 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright @ 1991 by Washington Law Review Association
SEARCH AND SEIZURE, THIRD-PARTY
CONSENT: RETHINKING POLICE CONDUCT
AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Abstract: Two recent decisions offer different approaches for assessing police conduct in
third-party consent cases. In Illinois v. Rodriguez the United States Supreme Court held
that police may rely on third parties' apparent authority to consent to a search so long as
police reasonably believe in third parties' authority. In State v. Leach, the Supreme Court
of Washington held that police cannot rely on third parties' consent when defendants are
present and able to object, even if defendants did not object to the search. This Comment
argues that courts should focus on police conduct, rather than on defendants' presence or
on the reasonable belief of police. Courts should require police to justify their reliance on
third parties' authority. If police can justify their reliance on third parties' authority,
courts should allow police to rely on third parties' consent, regardless of defendants' pres-
ence or absence. This approach achieves an appropriate balance between individual and
governmental interests by protecting individual rights without unduly impeding effective
law enforcement.
When may police rely on third parties' consent to search? Two
recent decisions provide dramatically different answers. In Illinois v.
Rodriguez,' the United States Supreme Court held that police could
rely on third parties' consent so long as police reasonably believed in
third parties' authority. The Court held that third parties' apparent
authority sufficed even when third parties did not have authority to
consent and defendants2 were present at the search. In State v.
Leach,3 a sharply divided Supreme Court of Washington held that
police could not rely on third parties' consent when defendants were
present and able to object, even when third parties had authority to
consent and defendants did not object to the search.
This Comment examines the significance of police conduct in con-
ducting a search based on third parties' consent. First, it reviews the
basic principles of third-party consent. Second, it analyzes Rodriguez
and Leach and concludes that neither case appropriately resolved the
issues surrounding third-party consent. Finally, it proposes an alter-
native analysis. Courts should focus on police conduct by requiring
police to justify their reliance on third parties' consent. Justification
requires police to exercise restraint and discretion. If police can justify
their reliance on third parties' authority, courts should allow police to
rely on third parties' consent regardless of defendants' presence or
1. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
2. This Comment refers to third parties' co-tenants as "defendants." This will not, of course,
always be so. See, eg., Lucero v. Donovan, 354 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1965).
3. 113 Wash. 2d 735, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989).
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absence. This approach balances all interests by protecting individual
rights without unduly restricting effective law enforcement.
I. THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATION FOR THIRD-PARTY
CONSENT
Competing interests lie at the heart of third-party consent. Con-
senting third parties have a right to act in their own self-interest.
Defendants have a right to expect a reasonable degree of freedom from
government intrusion. The government has an interest in suppressing
crime. Courts face many problems in defining and resolving the ten-
sion between these competing interests.
A. The Fourth Amendment and Consent
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution protects
privacy rights by prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures.4
The fourth amendment encompasses both individual and governmen-
tal interests.5 As a basic principle, it requires police to secure a search
warrant based on probable cause before conducting a search.6 With-
out a search warrant, police should respect a citizen's right to be "let
alone."7 Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable.8 However,
courts recognize several exceptions to the requirement that police
secure a warrant, for example, searches incident to lawful arrest,9 or
exigent circumstance,' ° or consent.1
4. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment applies to the states through incorporation in
the fourteenth amendment. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30-34 (1963). Washington State's
analogue to the fourth amendment is article I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution which
provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law." Article I, § 7 is generally interpreted as according Washington State citizens
greater protection than the fourth amendment. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148-49,
720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986). In the context of third-party consent, however, the limits of article I,
§ 7 are probably co-extensive with the fourth amendment. See infra note 32 and accompanying
text.
5. See, e.g., Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1105, 1107 (1989).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
7. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Maryland v. Buie, 110 S. Ct. 1093, 1097 (1990).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
10. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973).
11. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946).
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The fourth amendment only constrains government conduct. 2 The
fourth amendment does not address private parties' conduct. 3 Two
tests exist to assess fourth amendment violations. First, some courts
examine whether citizens' privacy interests or expectations are reason-
able.14 Second, some courts assess the general reasonableness of police
conduct." The traditional fourth amendment analysis under either
test balances governmental and individual interests. 6 When govern-
mental conduct upsets the delicate balance between state and individ-
ual interests, the exclusionary rule suppresses evidence resulting from
an illegal search and seizure.' 7 The exclusionary rule thus operates to
ensure compliance with the fourth amendment.1"
A search warrant is not required if an individual consents to a
search. 9 Third parties may consent to searches of areas shared with
others.20 Courts assess the validity of consent by looking at the total-
12. See, ag., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
13. See, e-g., id at 115 (fourth amendment was not implicated where airport personnel who
were not police opened package). States may broaden citizens' protections to encompass private
parties' conduct. See, eg., WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.73.010-140 (1988).
14. See, eg., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967) (for discussion on reasonable
expectations of privacy). State courts may interpret their respective constitutions as extending
broader protections to citizens than rights recognized under the United States Constitution. See,
eg., Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19, 27 (1989) (for
discussion on new federalism).
15. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 19-20 (1968). The general reasonableness test is
closely associated with the exclusionary rule. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19
(1984); Terry, 392 U.S. at 13-15. The exclusionary rule's function is to deter lawless police
conduct. See, eg., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974). If police conduct is
reasonable, it is not lawless. Therefore, some courts reason that there is no purpose in excluding
evidence resulting from an illegal search or seizure as long as police conduct is reasonable,
because excluding the evidence would serve no deterrent effect. See, eg., Leon, 468 U.S. at
918-19. Some state courts reject the Leon Court's analysis on state constitutional grounds. See,
eg., People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417, 488 N.E.2d 451, 458, 497 N.Y.S.2d 630, 634 (1985).
16. See, eg., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967).
17. See, eg., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963). Because the exclusionary
rule suppresses evidence resulting from an illegal search and seizure, the rule operates as a
remedy granting defendants relief from violations of their rights. But see infra note 113 and
accompanying text. Federal statutory remedies are also available where federal agents violate
citizens' rights under color of authority. See eg., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the FBI, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The Federal Tort Claims Act,
as amended in 1974, also provides citizens with a remedy. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680 (h) (West
Supp. 1990); S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2789, 2791.
18. A discussion of the exclusionary rule is beyond this Comment's scope. See Oaks,
Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970). For
criticism of the exclusionary rule, see Posner, Excessive Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct
in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1982).
19. See, eg., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
20. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
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ity of circumstances. 2 1 Courts focus on whether police unreasonably
infringe upon defendants' rights, not whether defendants abandon a
known right.22
B. Theoretical Principles of Third-Party Consent
To determine which third parties may consent to a search, courts
assess whether the third party has common authority over the
searched area.2" In United States v. Matlock,24 the United States
Supreme Court established the "common authority" test. In Matlock,
the defendant was arrested for bank robbery in front of the house
where he rented a room. 25 The defendant's girlfriend consented to a
search of the defendant's room.2 6 During the search, police found a
diaper bag stuffed with cash.2 7
The Court held that if the girlfriend possessed common authority
over the room, her consent could validate the search.2' The Court
defined "common authority" as essentially a two-part test.29 First,
consenting parties must be able to permit a search in their own right.
30
This capacity to consent is based on third parties' "joint access or con-
trol for most purposes" over the searched area.3 ' Second, it must be
reasonable for a court to find that defendants assumed the risk that
third parties might permit a search. 2
In applying the common authority test, courts assess third parties'
control over the searched area against defendants' reasonable expecta-
21. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49 (1973).
22. Id.
23. For an overview of third-party consent, including prior analyses, see 3 W. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.3 (2d ed. 1987). For discussion on the development of third-party
consent, see Comment, Third-Party Consent Searches: An Alternative Analysis 41 U. CHI. L.
REV. 121, 128-32 (1973).
24. 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
25. Id. at 166-68.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 166-67.
28. Id. at 177-78. The Court remanded the case to the district court to reconsider the
evidence regarding the girlfriend's common authority.
29. Id. at 171 n.7.
30. Id. The Court declined to address whether third parties' apparent authority would
suffice. Id. at 177 n.14; see also Brief for United States at 11-17, United States v. Matlock, 415
U.S. 164 (1974) (No. 72-1355). In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990), the Court held
that apparent authority sufficed to validate third parties' consent.
31. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.
32. Id. Washington adopted common authority as the test for determining third-party
consent under article I, § 7 of the Washington State Constitution. State v. Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d
537, 543, 688 P.2d 859 (1984). This suggests that the limits of article I, § 7, in the context of
third-party consent, are co-extensive with the fourth amendment.
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tion of privacy.3" Because the fourth amendment protects only rea-
sonable expectations of privacy, 4 third parties' joint control over the
property is the threshold issue for the common authority test. Defend-
ants' expectation of privacy is reduced by sharing living or working
space with third parties and, therefore, defendants assume the risk that
third parties will consent to a search. 5 Defendants' assumption of
risk is predicated on third parties' joint control.36 Once joint control is
found to exist, defendants' assumption of risk follows.37 If the search
unduly violates defendants' rights, however, courts typically will find
no assumption of risk even though third parties share control.38
Balancing third parties' control and defendants' privacy interests
requires courts to determine whether third parties' or defendants'
respective rights should control in any given case. Courts reach differ-
ent results depending on what significance they attach to third parties'
and defendants' respective interests.
The conflict between competing interests exists because the common
authority test leaves several questions unresolved. Two issues merit
particular attention. First, courts must determine what limits, if any,
to place on third parties' authority once police are inside the premises.
Because courts place different degrees of emphasis on third parties'
control and defendants' assumption of risk, courts define the scope of
common authority differently. Courts emphasizing defendants'
assumption of risk broadly extend third parties' authority.39 Courts
emphasizing third parties' authority, however, limit the scope of per-
missible searches to common areas.' Between these two poles are
33. See, eg., United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284, 1288 (8th Cir. 1974); Mathe, 102
Wash. 2d at 543.
34. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
35. See, e-g., Mathe, 102 Wash. 2d at 543, 544 n.1.
36. Id. at 544 n.l. Courts have never fully articulated why defendants' assumption of risk
should follow from third parties' joint control. Courts eschew property-based theories in
resolving third party consent. See, eg., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
37. See e-g., Matha 102 Wash. 2d at 544 n.1.
38. See, eg., Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 116,27 Cal. Rptr. 889
(1963) (holding that an absent third party's consent is invalid where police broke into an
apartment over defendant's objection).
39. For example, in People v. Posey, 99 I1. App. 3d 943,426 N.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 992 (1982), the third party and defendant shared a motel room which was deemed
sufficient for the third party to consent to a search of defendant's suitcase. See also United States
v. Reeves, 594 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1979) (where the door to the defendant's room is open and
access to the room is not obstructed, the third party who shares the apartment can consent to a
search of the defendant's bedroom), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 946 (1979).
40. For example, in United States v. Bussey, 507 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1974), the defendant and
third party shared a motel room. Unlike the court in People v. Posey, 99 IL. App. 3d 943, 426
N.E.2d 209 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 992 (1982), the Bussey court held that the third party
could consent to a search of the motel room, but not of the defendant's suitcase in the room. 507
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courts that recognize some parts of the common area as falling within
defendants' exclusive control, but only if defendants make some spe-
cial effort to designate that area as under their exclusive control and
not shared with third parties.41
Second, courts must determine whether common authority repre-
sents a waiver' of third parties' fourth amendment rights or an
implied waiver of defendants' rights. Some courts hold that consent
searches represent waivers of third parties' fourth amendment rights.43
Therefore, defendants' rights need not be analyzed, even if defendants
are present and object to the search, because the search is predicated
only on third parties' authority.' Alternatively, some courts hold
that defendants impliedly waive their fourth amendment rights by liv-
ing or working with others.45 Under this analysis, defendants' pres-
ence is significant, particularly if defendants object to a search, because
third parties cannot override defendants' fourth amendment rights.
Courts applying the implied waiver analysis hold that common
authority does not exist where defendants are present and objecting to
a search.46 This is based on the premise that defendants do not
assume the risk that third parties will admit others when defendants
are present and object to a search.47
C. Recent Developments: A Doctrine Evolves
Consent searches are a valuable weapon for law enforcement. Con-
sent searches, however, often infringe on citizens' fundamental privacy
F.2d at 1097; see also United States v. Heisman, 503 F.2d 1284 (8th Cir. 1974) (third party who
leased commercial space with the defendant could consent to a search of the common area, but
not to a search of the defendant's office, even though the office had no door and access to the
office was not obstructed).
41. For example, in United States v. Harrison, 679 F.2d 942, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the court
upheld a search because the boxes seized were not "sealed or taped" and were not "marked in
any way indicating [defendant's] ownership." See also United States v. Sealey, 830 F.2d 1028,
1031 (9th Cir. 1987) (seizure of pipes upheld where pipes were not marked or labelled to indicate
defendant's exclusive control).
42. Waiver contemplates a voluntary and intelligent choice to relinquish a known
constitutional right. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). Consent is not based
on an intelligent choice to relinquish a known right. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). The word "waiver" is used here to connote which parties' rights are
implicated in third-party consent searches.
43. See, e.g., United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Sealey, 630 F. Supp. 801, 809 (E.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd, 830 F.2d
1028 (9th Cir. 1987); People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422 N.Y.S.2d 652
(1979).
45. See, e.g., United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984); Lawton v. State,
320 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
46. See, e.g., Impink 728 F.2d at 1232-34.
47. Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U. CHI. L. REv. 47, 63 (1974).
Vol. 66:189, 1991
Third-Party Consent
rights. Third-party consent thus typifies the tension between sup-
pressing crime and safeguarding individual rights. Two recent third-
party consent cases illustrate the pressures between governmental and
individual interests.
1. Illinois v. Rodriguez: Apparent Authority Adopted
The United States Supreme Court's most recent examination of
third-party consent is Illinois v. Rodrigue 48 The Rodriguez Court
adopted the apparent authority analysis. The Court held that police
may rely on third parties' consent when third parties do not possess
common authority over the searched area as long as police reasonably
believe that third parties' common authority exists.49 A third party's
apparent authority validates consent searches even when defendants
are present during the search.5"
In Rodriguez, the defendant's girlfriend, Fischer, told police that
Rodriguez had beaten her.51 The police went to Rodriguez's apart-
ment to arrest him.52 The police assumed that Fischer shared the
apartment with Rodriguez because she described it as "our" apart-
ment and had a key to the door.53 Because the police did not ask
Fischer for details regarding the living arrangement, they did not
know that Fischer did not live in the apartment and had taken the key
without Rodriguez's knowledge. 54 Fischer went with the police to
Rodriguez's apartment, unlocked the door, and let the police inside.55
Once inside, the police found cocaine scattered throughout various
rooms.56 They awoke Rodriguez in his bedroom and arrested him.5"
The state trial court suppressed the evidence of seized cocaine
because Fischer did not have common authority over the apartment.58
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed, rejecting the state's argument
that a police officer's reasonable belief in Fischer's common authority
could validate the consent search. 59 The Illinois Supreme Court
denied appeal.'
48. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
49. Id. at 2801.
50. Id. at 2796.
51. Id. at 2796-97.
52. Id. at 2797.
53. Id. at 2797-98.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2797.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. People v. Rodriguez, 177 Ill. App. 3d 1154, 550 N.E.2d 65 (1988) (mem.).
60. People v. Rodriguez, 125 11. 2d 572, 537 N.E.2d 816 (1989) (mem.).
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 6' and
reversed. 62  The Court agreed that Fischer did not have common
authority over the apartment. 63 The Court noted, however, that
because Fischer had described Rodriguez's apartment as "our" apart-
ment, and because she had a key to the door, the police might reason-
ably have believed that Fischer did have common authority.' The
Court interpreted the fourth amendment to prohibit only unreasona-
ble searches, and characterized the key issue as whether police unrea-
sonably infringed on Rodriguez's rights, not whether Rodriguez's
expectation of privacy was reasonable. 65 The Court held that if police
reasonably believed in Fischer's common authority, they could rely on
Fischer's consent.66 The Court remanded for a determination of
whether police reasonably believed that Fischer possessed common
authority over the apartment.67
Three justices dissented, criticizing the majority's analysis on two
grounds. 68 First, the dissent observed that no exigent circumstance
existed and that police could have obtained a search warrant.69 Sec-
ond, the dissent noted that third-party consent is predicated on
defendants' assumption of risk.7" The dissent argued that Rodriguez
could not assume the risk that Fischer would consent to a search
because Fischer had no control over the apartment.7"
2. State v. Leach: Limiting Third Parties' Authority
State v. Leach72 is Washington's most recent case on third-party
consent and contrasts dramatically with Rodriguez. In Leach, the
defendant's girlfriend, Armstrong, told police that Leach had commit-
ted several burglaries.73 To support her charge, Armstrong gave
police items allegedly stolen by Leach.74 She then signed a consent
61. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 320 (1989). The state court had not clearly predicated its
holding on state law. Therefore, under Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court assumed that the state court applied federal law in reaching its decision.
62. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. at 2801-02 (1990).
63. Id. at 2798.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2798-2801.
66. Id. at 2801-02.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2802 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2802-03.
70. Id. at 2804.
71. Id.
72. 113 Wash. 2d 735, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989).
73. 113 Wash. 2d at 737.
74. Id.
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form authorizing police to search the business office where she worked
with Leach.7" The next day, Armstrong went to the office with the
police and unlocked the door.76 Upon entering, the police saw a copy-
ing machine that matched the description of one reported stolen.77
They also saw Leach on the floor of an adjacent room. 78 They
arrested Leach, searched the office, and recovered other stolen
goods. 79 Leach neither protested his arrest nor objected to the police
officers' entry and resulting search.8"
The trial court denied a suppression motion and subsequently
entered a guilty judgment on three counts of second degree burglary
and one count of second degree attempted theft.81 The Court of
Appeals reversed.8 2 It questioned the search's validity in two respects.
First, the court noted that the record was silent as to Leach's con-
sent.83 Second, the court observed that the trial court had not bal-
anced Leach's and Armstrong's respective privacy interests.84 The
court remanded for a determination of these issues and the state
appealed. 85
In a pronounced 5-4 split, the Supreme Court of Washington
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision.86 The court held that Arm-
strong's consent could not validate the search because Leach was pres-
ent when the police entered.8 7 Leach's silence was insufficient to
justify the search because the police were responsible for securing
Leach's consent once they were aware of his presence. 8 The court
held that if a defendant is "present and able to object," police must
obtain the defendant's consent.8 9 The court also noted that police had
both time and sufficient probable cause to secure a search warrant, yet
they neglected to do so.9 The court remanded for a determination of
whether Leach had, in fact, consented to the search.91
75. Id. at 737-38.
76. Id. at 737.
77. Md
78. Id. at 747 (Dore, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 737.
80. Id. at 737-38, 745.
81. State v. Leach, 52 Wash. App. 490, 491, 761 P.2d 83, 85 (1988).
82. 52 Wash. App. at 496-97.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989).
87. 113 Wash. 2d at 744.
88. Id.
89. Id
90. Id.
91. Id
197
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A vigorous dissent argued that Armstrong's consent should have
sufficed to validate the search under Washington law because she was
a joint occupant of the office.92 The dissent further observed that
police were not required to seek Leach's consent after lawfully arrest-
ing him, and that the search could be upheld as a search incident to
lawful arrest.93
II. RETHINKING POLICE CONDUCT AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
Third-party consent requires a flexible analysis in order to accomo-
date all competing interests. Neither Rodriguez nor Leach offers an
adequate solution. Rodriguez ignores individual rights by allowing
police to rely on third parties' consent even when third parties lack
any authority to consent and defendants are present at the search.
Leach undermines governmental interests by requiring police to obtain
present defendants' consent even when defendants have not objected
to the search and third parties with common authority have consented
to the search.
A better approach is to focus on police conduct, instead of on
defendants' presence or the reasonable belief of police.94 Courts
should require police to justify their reliance on third parties' consent.
If police can justify their reliance on third parties' authority, courts
should allow police to rely on third parties' consent regardless of
defendants' presence or absence. The current test of common author-
ity, supplemented by existing fourth amendment doctrine, provides
the conceptual tool that is needed to effect a proper resolution to third-
party consent.
A. Rodriguez Undermines Individual Rights
The United States Supreme Court erred in adopting the apparent
authority test.95 Rodriguez is flawed for five reasons. First, Rodriguez
92. Id. at 749-50. Prior Washington decisions have not annulled third parties' consent
because of defendants' presence. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 88 Wash. 2d 127, 559 P.2d 970, cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 876 (1977); State v. Chichester, 48 Wash. App. 257, 738 P.2d 329 (1987).
93. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d at 748-49.
94. Other authors have proposed various government-oriented models to assess fourth
amendment issues. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 416-28 (1974); Matthews, Third-Party Consent Searches: Some Necessary Safeguards,
10 VAL. U.L. REV. 29 (1976).
95. For a prior critique of apparent authority see Comment, Relevance of the Absent Party's
Whereabouts in Third Party Consent Searches, 53 B.U.L. REV. 1087 (1974). This Comment
differs in analysis but agrees that apparent authority, on its own, is an inadequate test for third-
party consent.
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severs citizens' rights from the fourth amendment. The apparent
authority test ignores that the fourth amendment's purpose is to pro-
tect citizens. The fourth amendment restrains police from acting
unreasonably in order to shield citizens' privacy interests from govern-
ment intrusion.96 Rodriguez transforms the fourth amendment into an
instrument that restrains police from acting unreasonably in order that
they may act reasonably. Under Rodriguez, there is no fourth amend-
ment violation as long as police reasonably believe in third parties'
authority.
Second, Rodriguez uses an incorrect standard to assess fourth
amendment violations. Rodriguez subjects citizens' rights to a test
predicated on an objective standard existing within the particular pro-
fession of law enforcement.97 If police reasonably believe their con-
duct is proper, they may invade citizens' privacy. Few citizens,
however, would reasonably believe that police could enter and search
their homes or offices based on a stranger's consent simply because
police reasonably believed that the stranger possessed common
authority over the searched area. If the fourth amendment's test is an
objective standard, the test should embody general societal norms 9s
and not the objective standards unique to a particular profession.
Third, Rodriguez underemphasizes the practical realities that attend
search and seizure cases. Police engaged in the "competitive enter-
prise of ferreting out crime" 9 will necessarily believe that their con-
duct is proper, and will shape their testimony accordingly. 1" Police
wrestle with a difficult, perhaps impossible, mission. It is problematic
whether police will squelch a possible search because of doubts regard-
ing third parties' authority.
Fourth, the apparent authority test sets no limits on police conduct.
Reasonable belief requires no initial predicate to justify the belief that
third parties possess common authority. Police are not expected to
ask any questions to ascertain third parties' authority. The apparent
96. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1967).
97. The objective standard of Rodriguez ostensibly represents that of a reasonable person and
is not restricted to police officers' reasonable belief. Reasonableness is assessed, however, by
focusing on principal agents' acts or omissions. Police are the principal agents in third-party
consent. For example, Rodriguez knew that no one else shared his apartment, yet it was not
reasonable for him to assume that police could not search his apartment based on a stranger's
consent. Therefore, the objective standard inherent in the Rodriguez analysis specifically
addresses police objective standards and not general public standards.
98. See eg., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-83 (1984); Comment, Defining a
Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61
WASH. L. REv. 191, 194 (1986).
99. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
100. See, e.g., Oaks, supra note 18, at 699.
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authority test encourages police to stay silent and assume that third
parties have the authority to consent, rather than risk confirming any
doubts regarding third parties' authority by asking questions.101
Finally, Rodriguez effectively destroys the common authority test.
Before Rodriguez, third-party consent required common authority.
After Rodriguez, however, third-party consent requires only an
officer's reasonable belief that third parties possess common authority.
The practical effect is that courts will ignore the common authority
test and concentrate instead on the reasonable belief of police.
B. Leach Undermines Governmental Interests
Leach's present-absent distinction imposes two correlated man-
dates. First, third parties may consent only when their co-tenants are
absent.102 Second, if defendants are present and able to object, police
must obtain defendants' consent, regardless of whether defendants are
objecting to the search or not.1 °3 The Supreme Court of Washington
erred in imposing this present-absent distinction. The Leach rule is
flawed for five reasons.
First, Leach's present-absent distinction misstates the issue of
defendants' assumption of risk. The present-absent distinction rests
on the premise that nonobjecting, present defendants have not
assumed the risk that third parties might permit a search."° The
problem with this premise is that defendants' assumption of risk is
predicated on third parties'joint control. 10 5 Once joint control exists,
defendants' assumption of risk follows. 10 6 If defendants assume the
risk that their co-tenants might permit entry, this assumption of risk
101. The dynamics of litigation will quickly stretch "reasonable belief" beyond
comprehension. Good prosecutors thoroughly prepare police witnesses. The pressures of
ensuring a conviction will spur after-the-fact reconstructions of circumstances attending third
parties' consent. See, e.g., id.
102. State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035 (1989).
103. 113 Wash. 2d at 744.
104. Id. at 740, 744. The Leach court relied on Professor Weinreb's interpretation of Matlock
that the common authority test only operates where absent, nonconsenting defendants are
involved. See id. at 740; Weinreb, supra note 47, at 62 n.45. The actual language in the Matlock
opinion, however, seems nothing more than a reference to another case where the defendant
happened to be absent. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1974). Courts have not
construed Matlock as distinguishing between present or absent defendants. See, e.g., United
States v. Sumlin, 567 F.2d 684, 687-88 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978).
105. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
106. See id.
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should remain constant regardless of nonobjecting defendants' pres-
ence or absence.107
Second, the Leach rule inadequately safeguards individual fights
because it is founded on a degree of chance ill-suited to qualify as
meaningful protection. Leach does not require police to secure
nonobjecting defendants' consent if defendants are absent, even when
defendants are in custody and police could readily secure their con-
sent. °10 Nonobjecting defendants' fights should not hinge on their for-
tuitous presence at a search.109
Third, the present-absent distinction conflicts with contemporary
definitions of consent. The Leach rule requires police to secure con-
sent from present, nonobjecting defendants who are able to object.
Consent, however, is assessed by the totality of the circumstances.
Consent is not based on whether defendants willingly abandon a
known protection, but whether unreasonable police conduct infringes
upon defendants' fights.110
Fourth, the Leach rule compounds courts' tasks in resolving search
and seizure issues. The present-absent distinction spawns numerous
questions in an area of law already plagued with factual quirks.
Courts must determine when defendants are absent or able to object.
Courts must determine when defendants' fights are implicated because
it is not clear how "present" defendants must be before the present-
absent distinction is triggered.
Finally, the bright line painted by Leach creates numerous practical
problems for police. Police will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
meaningfully integrate the present-absent distinction into routine field
operations. Although the present-absent distinction does not mandate
that police locate defendants' whereabouts, the practical effect requires
that they do so. At the very least, police cannot risk responding to a
call, entering a home or office, encountering defendants inside, and
having to leave. 1 Additionally, if more than two individuals are
involved, it will not be cost-effective to require police to trace, identify,
107. See, eg., Sumlin, 567 F.2d at 688 (defendant's refusal to consent did not reduce his
assumption of risk).
108. See Leach, 113 Wash. 2d at 740.
109. See, eg., Wefing & Miles, Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: Voluntariness
and Third Party Problems, 5 SEToN HALL L. REV. 211, 280 (1974).
110. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
111. This assumes, moreover, that police are operating with some clear idea of who they are
looking for or what they are attempting to accomplish. More typically, as the Schneckloth court
observed, consent searches arise spontaneously in reaction to rapidly developing circumstances
and facts. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).
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and locate each of several possible defendants before soliciting
consent.
C. An Alternative Analysis: Discretionary Restraint
Courts could achieve a better result in assessing third-party consent
by focusing on police conduct. Courts should require police to justify
their reliance on third parties' consent rather than concentrating on
defendants' presence or the reasonable belief of police. Courts should
limit police discretion in conducting third-party consent searches in
two ways. First, police should comply with the fourth amendment's
warrant clause. Second, police should adhere to institutional self-
restraint in warrantless situations. Institutional self-restraint embod-
ies the common authority test. This proposal is called discretionary
restraint.
1. Foundation: Why Focus on Police Conduct?
Courts should focus on police conduct. Remedies define rights." 2
The fourth amendment remedy".3 is the exclusionary rule which
focuses on police conduct. 14 There is no fourth amendment violation
if police conduct is reasonable because if police conduct is reasonable
the exclusionary rule will not suppress evidence. 51 5 Therefore, a start-
ing place for assessing third-party consent is examining police
conduct. 1 6
Focusing on police conduct is different from focusing on police
belief. The Rodriguez standard of police belief cannot be objectively
verified by referencing any external facts. Police conduct is objectively
verifiable because it represents what the police actually did or said as
opposed to what they thought or believed.
112. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 169 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("Just so far as the
aid of the public force is given a man, he has a legal right .... "). Where citizens have no
adequate remedy, their rights are empty promises void of content. See Oaks, supra note 18, at
755-57 (discussing the importance of defining new fourth amendment remedies).
113. The exclusionary rule is referred to here as a remedy. Traditionally, however, the rule is
not concerned with the "wronged" defendant, but rather with deterring lawless conduct by the
government. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Traynor, Mapp v.
Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 335.
114. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347-48.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-19 (1984); see also supra notes 15-18
and accompanying text. Civil remedies will probably also fail if police conduct is reasonable
because of the doctrine of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Mark v. Williams, 45 Wash. App. 182,
724 P.2d 428 (1986) (for discussion on police conduct and civil remedies).
116. The government presented a conceptually indistinguishable analysis in Matlock in
arguing for apparent authority's adoption. Brief for United States at 14, United States v.
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) (No. 72-1355).
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2 How Discretionary Restraint Works
Discretionary restraint is founded on two premises. First, police
should comply with the fourth amendment's warrant clause. If police
can obtain a warrant, courts should not allow them to rely on third
parties' consent, absent some compelling or exigent circumstance.
Enforcing the warrant clause would protect individual rights because
it interposes an impartial magistrate between individuals and the gov-
ernment. Enforcing the warrant clause would also enhance effective
law enforcement because it reduces the risk of having evidence
suppressed. 117
Discretionary restraint's second premise addresses warrantless situ-
ations. When a warrant cannot be secured because of exigent circum-
stances or lack of probable cause, discretionary restraint employs the
existing common authority test, but with a slightly different focus.
Courts grappling with the common authority test attempt to reconcile
both defendants' and third parties' respective reasonable expectations
of privacy. 118 Discretionary restraint argues that the threshold test for
determining reasonableness should focus on police conduct. Courts
should examine the factors that made police reliance on third parties'
consent reasonable. Courts should determine what steps police took
to ascertain third parties' authority to consent and how police assessed
the limits of third parties' authority once police were inside the prem-
ises. An initial focus on police conduct protects individual rights
because it ensures that courts will review the actual exercise of police
discretion. A focus on police conduct also enhances effective law
enforcement because it encourages the development of discretionary
guidelines. 119
a. The Warrant Clause as an Initial Check on Discretion
Probable cause is the most significant factor in defining what is or is
not reasonable. If the goal is to limit or frame police conduct within a
working set of discretionary checks, police should not readily circum-
vent the warrant clause.120 Therefore, the first premise of discretion-
ary restraint is that soliciting third parties' consent where probable
cause exists and there is no exigent circumstance contravenes the war-
117. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 94, at 417-29.
118. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
119. See e.g., Oaks, supra note 18, at 678-81, 708, 711-12, 753 (1970) (discussing possible
implications that result when judicial scrutiny of police conduct is heightened). Regarding the
benefits of police-promulgated guidelines, see Amsterdam, supra note 94, at 417-29.
120. See eg., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 758-62 (1969).
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rant clause and is unreasonable."' If the police can secure a search
warrant, courts should not permit them to rely on third parties' con-
sent, absent some compelling or exigent circumstance.
b. Reviewing Police Discretion in Warrantless Situations
Discretionary restraint's operation is best examined in the context
of warrantless searches. Courts are split in determining what limits, if
any, they should place on third parties' authority once police are
inside the premises. 122 Discretionary restraint recommends that
courts address two issues. First, courts should determine how police
assessed third parties' authority to consent. Second, courts should
examine how police assessed the extent of third parties' authority once
police were inside the premises. 123
Apparent authority should suffice for assessing third parties' author-
ity to consent and for determining the limits of third parties' authority
inside the searched area. Police act on the basis of appearance. To
safeguard against abuses, however, there should be a presumption that
third parties lack authority. This presumption should be rebuttable
only by asking basic questions that establish third parties' authority.
This presumes some level of ongoing, if informal, questioning both
before a search begins and as it progresses. 124 Without some determi-
nation of third parties' authority to consent and the limits of this
authority inside the premises, courts should not allow police to enter
and search an area.
c. Factoring in Presence-Absence
The parties' presence or absence is important in framing workable
checks on police discretion. When third parties are present, police
have a reasonable means of ascertaining the extent of third parties'
control over the premises. So long as police have made initial attempts
121. See, e.g., United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984); State v. Leach,
113 Wash. 2d 735, 744, 782 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1989).
122. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
123. A comparable analysis is found in Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 1967
WASH. U.L.Q. 12. Both authority to consent and authority to search are defined by reference to
the existing common authority test. Authority to consent requires "mutual use or access for
most purposes." United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974). Authority to search
extends to areas of mutual use, called "common areas," where it is reasonable for courts to find
that defendants assumed the risk. Id.
124. Rodriguez implicitly rejects any requirement that police ask questions before proceeding.
An earlier Seventh Circuit decision expressly dismissed an argument that police should be
required to ask questions before searching. United States v. Richardson, 562 F.2d 476, 480 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1021 (1978).
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to ascertain third parties' authority, it should be incumbent upon pres-
ent defendants to assert their privacy rights. If both third parties and
defendants claim possession or dispute access, a presumption should
arise in defendants' favor.'25 More weight should be accorded defend-
ants who are present if third parties are absent. In this situation,
courts should require police to explain the purpose of the search and
who has consented to it.'26
Focusing on whether third parties are present or absent, rather than
whether defendants are present, raises a new distinction. This distinc-
tion is justified for two reasons. First, when third parties are absent,
police have no means of ascertaining third parties' control over the
area. Without such means, it should be unreasonable for police to
search. Second, even if police have some means of determining third
parties' authority, such as a description from absent third parties of
the searched area,'27 it should be considered presumptively unreasona-
ble for police to proceed without third parties. Defendants cannot
know whether, or under what circumstances, absent third parties con-
sented to the search.
3. Advantages of Discretionary Restraint
There are three advantages to discretionary restraint. First, it
encourages government restraint without needlessly eroding effective
law enforcement. Police are not absolutely barred by defendants' pres-
ence, yet police are expected to exercise their discretion both before
and during a search based on third parties' consent.
Second, discretionary restraint avoids the dilemma of defining sub-
stantive fourth amendment rights in the amorphous context of third-
party consent. Although defendants' and third parties' respective rea-
sonable expectations of privacy are the lynchpin in assessing third-
party consent,' 28 fourth amendment substantive protections resist defi-
nition.'29 Because it is difficult to define the fourth amendment's sub-
stantive protections, unpredictable decisions result. 30
125. Courts should require a strong showing of third parties' authority to rebut defendants'
claims.
126. See, eg., Tompkins v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 65, 378 P.2d 113, 116, 27 Cal. Rptr.
889 (1963).
127. See, e.g., Government of Canal Zone v. Sierra, 594 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1979).
128. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 94, at 415; Comment, supra note 98, at 194-95 (1986).
More troubling is the susceptibility of substantive rights to "retransformation." See Junker,
supra note 5, at 1118-24, 1166-69.
130. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 370-74 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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The danger of unpredictable decisions is exacerbated by two factors
in third-party consent. First, although courts speak of privacy rights
and have avoided tying the fourth amendment to property concepts,
property and privacy are difficult to distinguish."' It is difficult to
determine where third parties' property rights begin and where
defendants' reasonable expectations of privacy end. Second, the shift-
ing nature of personal and professional relationships is difficult to
translate into traditional fourth amendment dialogue. 32 Many rela-
tionships are subjective in nature. The fourth amendment protects
reasonable expectations of privacy, yet individuals living and working
together can, and will, structure their privacy in "unreasonable"
ways. 13
3
Searches and seizures, however, are delimited by clear procedural
aspects. First, a case-by-case approach is required because of the vari-
able facts and circumstances that are adjudicated.1 34 Uniform princi-
ples best serve this case-by-case approach. 35 Second, police should
not readily circumvent the warrant clause.1 36 A procedural approach
consistent with discretionary restraint enables courts to impose flexible
restraints on police conduct and thus avoid the dilemma of defining
substantive protections in amorphous contexts.
The third advantage of discretionary restraint is that courts could
apply it with little variation from existing standards of police conduct
or judicial methodology. Discretionary restraint is conceptually con-
sistent with current assessments of police conduct within third-party
consent.
Courts now implicitly examine police conduct in third-party con-
sent along a sliding scale of exigency. When exigent circumstances
exist, defendants' presence at the search is rarely considered important
and courts accord police great deference in the exercise of police dis-
cretion. 137 When the facts border on exigency, defendants' presence is
131. See Weinreb, supra note 47, at 52, 59.
132. See, e.g., Coombs, Shared Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of
Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593, 1611-13 (1987).
133. See Weinreb, supra note 47, at 61-62.
134. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 400 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. See White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study of
Robinson and Matlock, 1974 Sup. Cr. REV. 165, 169.
136. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
137. For example, in United States v. Hendrix, 595 F.2d 883 (D.C. Cir. 1979), the court
upheld a search conducted over the defendant's protest. In Hendrix, the defendant abused his
wife in a "violent day-long argument," and police intervened at the wife's request to seize the
defendant's shotgun. Id. at 885; see also People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286, 397 N.E.2d 1319, 422
N.Y.S.2d 652 (1979).
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factored into the analysis and courts carefully assess police conduct.13
Absent any compelling or exigent circumstances, defendants' presence
is accorded great weight in the overall analysis and courts strictly
scrutinize police conduct. 139 The exigent-nonexigent factor implicit in
current case law indicates that discretionary restraints can be crafted
and applied in a manner that both recognizes flexibility and fosters
consistency. Discretionary restraint adequately recognizes doctrinal
flexibility while imparting a measure of consistency that is readily
incorporated into existing standards of police conduct and judicial
methodology.
III. CONCLUSION
Discretionary restraint urges courts to assess police conduct as a
threshold inquiry into the validity of third-party consent. If the fourth
amendment is a dual-interest instrument, both individual and govern-
mental interests should be examined. Rather than relying solely on an
assessment of defendants' and third parties' substantive rights, courts
should incorporate the rights and duties of the government into the
analysis.
Under discretionary restraint, Leach was correctly decided because
the police needlessly circumvented the warrant clause. The govern-
ment has no justifiable purpose for relying on third parties' consent
when a warrant can be secured. By raising a present-absent distinc-
tion, however, the Supreme Court of Washington erred. The present-
absent distinction conflicts with contemporary definitions of consent
and is founded on a degree of chance ill-suited to qualify as a meaning-
ful protection.
Discretionary restraint suggests that Rodriguez reached an incorrect
result. Apparent authority is theoretically sound in principle, but is
stretched to its limits in Rodriguez Apparent authority ignores both
individual rights and the practical realities of police operations.
Courts should focus on police conduct to avoid the problems posed by
Leach and Rodriguez.
Ultimately, the validity of any third-party consent search hinges on
the totality of the circumstances. The multiple variables that comprise
138. See, eg., United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 666 (9th Cir. 1980) (search of van
upheld where defendant was present but did not object); United States v. Canada, 527 F.2d 1374,
1377-79 (9th Cir. 1975) (airport search of defendant's suitcase upheld where third party
consented to search and defendant was present but did not object), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867
(1976).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1984); Lawton v. State,
320 So. 2d 463, 464 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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the totality cannot be pared away or arranged in an ordered set analo-
gous to a periodic table. The variables can, however, be arrayed
within a flexible analysis that attempts to balance both governmental
and individual interests. Discretionary restraint is one means of
achieving this goal.
Gregory S. Fisher
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